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RISKY BUSINESS: THE CREDIT CRISIS AND 
FAILURE (PART II) 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa* 
I. REGULATORY FAILURES AND REGULATORY REFORM 
The credit crisis underscores the need for reform of regulatory and in-
dustry approaches to risk.  Reframing risk should entail greater limitations 
on leverage and more comprehensive internal company risk management, 
with both external regulatory monitoring and more robust internal efforts.  
As a number of post-credit crisis compensation proposals have recommend-
ed, companies should also be encouraged to follow best practices with re-
spect to compensation and bonuses based on performance.1  Best practices 
should involve greater consideration of the ways in which compensation 
rewards take account of risks, particularly for traders whose activities entail 
significant risk exposure.2  Such best practices in compensation might in-
clude, for example, creating a clawback or tail for compensation that 
matches the time horizon of receipt of compensation to the time horizon of 
trading activities for which an employee is compensated.  Regulated com-
panies in the financial services industry should also be required to disclose 
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1
  See, e.g., Daniel Davies, Remuneration and Risk, 1997 FIN. STABILITY REV. 18, 19, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/1997/art4(Issue%202).pdf (―Thus a commission on 
trading profits will affect risk taking behaviour because its value almost entirely depends on the risks 
taken with the firm’s capital.‖) (link); Raghuram Rajan, Bankers‟ Pay is Deeply Flawed, FT.COM, Jan. 
9, 2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto010920081142101282 (―The managers 
who blew a big hole in Morgan Stanley’s balance sheet probably earned enormous bonuses in the 
past[.] . . . If Morgan Stanley managed its compensation correctly those bonuses should be clawed back 
and should be enough to pay those who did well this year without increasing the bonus 
pool[.] . . . [U]nless we fix incentives in the financial system we will get more risk than we bargain 
for.‖) (link). 
2
  Davies, supra note 1, at 22 (―Remuneration policy has an important part to play in a firm’s overall 
management of risk.  It can contribute to, or make more difficult, the reconciliation of the firm’s own 
risk/return trade-off with those of its employees.  As such it is of increasing interest and concern to su-
pervisors and regulators.‖). 
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between compensation and risk, in order to comply with mandatory disclo-
sures in risk disclosure discussions.  All regulated and unregulated firms 
should also be required to immediately report all material incidents that re-
flect a failure of risk controls or risk management to a market stability regu-
lator.  External regulation can be used to promote development of internal 
risk management in the financial industry.  The credit crisis, however, rais-
es serious questions about the effectiveness of existing financial market 
regulatory approaches. 
A. Shaky Foundations: Regulatory Failures and the Credit Crisis 
Current U.S. regulatory approaches result in costly and sometimes 
overlapping regulatory structures, particularly because new regulatory 
structures may be imposed on top of existing ones with insufficient atten-
tion to efficiency or effectiveness.  The United States has multiple federal, 
state, and industry regulatory bodies whereas Britain has one, and regulato-
ry costs in the United States have been estimated to be fifteen times those in 
Britain.3  Although U.S. regulators have been fairly successful at some as-
pects of domestic coordination,4 including through the President’s Working 
Group,5 the credit crisis highlights the limits of fragmented U.S. regulatory 
frameworks in regulating systemic risk. 
The credit crisis thus raises significant concerns about the appropriate 
design of regulatory institutions.6  The credit crisis has triggered a plethora 
of proposals for greater regulation of the financial services industry in the 
U.S. and elsewhere.7  However, we should resist efforts that merely seek to 





  Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, WSJ.COM, 
Nov. 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116234404428809623.html (link). 
4
  GROUP OF THIRTY (G30), THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND 
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 222–23 (2008) [hereinafter G30]. 
5
  Id. at 223 (noting that the President’s Working Group includes the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Chairmen of the Board of the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the CFTC, and was established to provide a 
―major crisis-coordinating mechanism‖). 
6
  See, e.g., Posting of Edward L. Glaeser, A Failure of Regulation, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES 
ECONOMIX BLOG, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/a-failure-of-regulation-not-
capitalism, June 9, 2009 (―Regulatory institutions need to be designed in ways that are stronger and less 
prone to being co-opted by the industry that they are meant to regulate.  Our financial markets cannot 
operate without strong public protection of property rights, and there are times when such protection re-
quires restricting the actions of private entities, at least when they are publicly insured.‖) (link). 
7
  See, e.g., Brendan Nelson, Regulation after the Credit Crunch: Backlash or Measured Response?, 
KPMG FRONTIERS IN FINANCE, July 2008, at 4, available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Frontiers-in-
Finance/Documents/frontiers-in-finance-2008-Jul.pdf (―The institutional and market failures of the past 
year have spurred legislators and regulators around the world into action.‖) (link); Barry Eichengreen & 
Richard Baldwin, WHAT G20 LEADERS MUST DO TO STABILISE OUR ECONOMY AND FIX THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1, 1 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Baldwin eds., 2008) (―Everyone agrees on the 
need to strengthen supervision and regulation, but there is no agreement on how to go about this.‖) 
(link). 
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tions in the United States did not avert the current crisis.  Adding yet more 
layers is unlikely to reduce risk.  The addition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 to the regulatory mix, for example, likely harmed U.S. global compe-
titiveness by imposing onerous duties on public companies that did little to 
avert the credit crisis.8  Financial markets have long existed in the shadow 
of self-regulation by industry participants, private regulation through gate-
keepers such as rating agencies, and government regulation.  In the after-
math of the credit market crisis, we should direct significant attention to 
determining how and why these existing regulatory frameworks failed. 
Assessing past regulatory failures may facilitate the promulgation of 
better regulation that is both flexible and effective, as opposed to simply 
more regulation.  Regulatory approaches should also focus to a greater ex-
tent on the implications of market activities and trading practices for sys-
temic risk, with the goal of developing regulatory structures that create 
incentives for individual market participants and firms to better manage 
their own risk.  Regulatory structures should also enable regulators to moni-
tor the appropriateness of market participants’ treatment of risk, as reflected 
in their activities. 
In addition, regulatory structures should allow for effective monitoring 
and evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of regulators, including 
determining whether industry capture exists in a particular regulatory arena.  
New regulatory structures need to be global in scope, through both coopera-





  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) (link), which ―introduced a series of corporate governance initiatives 
into the federal securities laws‖, Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (link), was a regulatory response to specific 
events, particularly corporate fraud, at companies such as Enron and WorldCom that occurred during the 
late 1990s.  Id. at 1523–1526.  Sarbanes-Oxley has been criticized for the costs it imposed, see COMM. 
ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 1–
5 (2007) (discussing the ―significant deterioration‖ in the competitiveness of the U.S. public equity mar-
ket in recent years) (link); CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, STRENGTHENING U.S. CAPITAL 
MARKETS: A CHALLENGE FOR ALL AMERICANS 20–21 (2008) [hereinafter CAPITAL MKTS. 
COMPETITIVENESS] (discussing the cost burdens of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (link), and has led 
some foreign companies with U.S. stock listings to delist from U.S. markets.  See Loredana Ureche-
Rangau & Andrea Carugati, Foreign Delisting and Domestic Stock Value: Multiple Frameworks, Differ-
ent Views?, in 4 ENTERPRISE APPLICATIONS AND SERVICES IN THE FINANCE INDUSTRY 112, 113 (Daniel 
J. Veit et al. eds., 2008) (evaluating assertions that Sarbanes-Oxley has led to foreign companies delist-
ing from U.S. markets).  Some assert that Sarbanes-Oxley has harmed the global competitiveness of 
U.S. capital markets.  See CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 21; SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S 
AND THE U.S.’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, Jan. 2007, at 86–87, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (―The United States is also perceived as being at a 
disadvantage when it comes to the individual and collective impact of its financial regulation.  By far the 
most often mentioned regulation in interviews was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which was also 
heavily criticized on the surveys.‖) (link). 
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tures where appropriate.9  New regulatory structures should reflect the rec-
ognition that no magic bullet can address the regulatory and industry fail-
ings that led to the credit crisis.  Rather, new regulations must create a 
regulatory architecture that is able to respond in different ways to varied 
sources of potential future risk in financial markets. 
Indeed, regulatory failures contributed significantly to the credit crisis.  
The SEC’s regulation of investment banks under its voluntary Consolidated 
Supervised Entities (CSE) framework provides one example of regulatory 
failure.10  The SEC adopted this now-suspended program in 2004 to provide 
consolidated SEC supervision of investment bank holding companies, con-
sistent with Federal Reserve oversight of bank holding companies.11  The 
voluntary CSE program permitted a holding company to measure group-
wide capital adequacy in accordance with the Basel II Accord,12 which 
created international standards for determining financial industry capital re-
quirements.13  CSE participants consented to a number of regulatory meas-
ures.  They permitted the SEC to examine books and records of the 
principal holding company, consented to reporting requirements, made re-
ports of entities in the group available for SEC regulatory examination that 
were not subject to SEC examination, and provided the SEC with informa-
tion concerning credit and risk exposures and analyses of liquidity risk.14  
The CSE program was intended to enable firms with ―strong internal risk 
management‖ to use alternative methods to calculate net capital adequacy.15  
It permitted use of the same mathematical methods for managing business 
risk and for calculating net determinate regulatory capital requirements.16  
These alternative capital calculations were less stringent than the SEC’s tra-





  See Martin Wolf, Why Agreeing a New Bretton Woods is Vital, FT.COM, Nov. 4, 2008, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7cc47dfe-aa95-11dd-897c-000077b07658.html (describing the need for a 
global solution to the current financial crisis and global prevention of future crises) (link).  
10
  See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (SEC), Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter, SEC, End of CSE Program], 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.html (describing the voluntary nature of the CSE pro-
gram as ―fundamentally flawed‖) (link). 
11
  Id. 
12
  Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Super-
vised Entities, 69 FED. REG. 34,428, 34,444 (June 21, 2004) [hereinafter CSE Rule], 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.pdf (link). 
13
  See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 1 (2006) (link); BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, THE APPLICATION OF BASEL II TO TRADING ACTIVITIES AND THE TREATMENT 
OF DOUBLE DEFAULT EFFECTS 1 (2005). 
14
  CSE Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 34,429. 
15
  Id. at 34,428; see id. at 34,429–34,430 (―[W]e are adopting rule amendments that provide broker-
dealers with a voluntary, alternative method of computing net capital that permits very highly capita-
lized broker-dealers to use their internal mathematical models for net capital purposes, subject to speci-
fied conditions.‖). 
16
  Id. at 34,428. 
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program participants.17  Given that industry risk models have proved inade-
quate in the face of the credit crisis,18 it is not surprising that capital calcula-
tions based on these same risk models have also proved inadequate.19  The 
CSE program was not effective in meeting its stated goals of monitoring 
risk and operational weaknesses.  In fact, CSE program participants in-
cluded Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and 
Goldman Sachs, many of which have been focal points in the credit crisis.20  
SEC Inspector General reports reveal inattention to questions of systemic 
risk,21 coordination problems within the SEC,22 and enforcement failings 
that contributed to the CSE program’s regulatory failures.23 
Additionally, the role of the SEC and other financial market regulators 
in the failure of Lehman Brothers, particularly with respect to Lehman’s ac-





  John C. Coffee, Jr., Analyzing the Credit Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in Action, LAW.COM, Dec. 
5, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202426495544 (link); John C. Coffee, Jr. & 
Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 735–
37 (2009) (link). 
18
  See, e.g., CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 166 (2008) (testimony of Charles Prince, former Chairman and CEO, 
Citigroup) (―Last fall, it became apparent that the risk models which Citigroup, the various rating agen-
cies, and the rest of the financial community used to assess certain mortgage-backed securities were 
wrong.‖); John Cassidy, What‟s Wrong with Risk Models?, NEW YORKER RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY 
BLOG, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/04/whats-wrong-with-
risk-models.html (―The risk models that were commonly used on Wall Street failed abysmally.  Not on-
ly did they fail to protect their users from a bad outcome, they made such an outcome far more likely.  In 
short, the risk models added to systemic risk.‖) (link). 
19
  See Coffee, Jr. & Sale, supra note 17, at 735–36 (pointing out that all five investment banking 
firms that entered the CSE program, and therefore used capital calculations based on industry risk model 
calculations, either failed or were gravely imperiled). 
20
  See Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-52857, 86 SEC Docket 1954 (Nov. 30, 2005) (link); Order Regarding Alter-
native Net Capital Computation for Lehman Brothers Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-52753, 86 
SEC Docket 1641 (Nov. 9, 2005) (link); Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for 
Morgan Stanley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-52145, 85 SEC Docket 3318 (July 28, 2005) 
(link); Order Regarding Alternative Net Capital Computation for Goldman, Sachs, & Co., Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-51421, 85 SEC Docket 75 (Mar. 23, 2005) (link); Order Regarding Alternative Net Cap-
ital Computation for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-50925, 84 SEC Docket 1974 (Dec. 23, 2004) (link). 
21
  See SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED 
ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 446-A, at 46–51 (Sept. 25, 
2008) [hereinafter SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT 446-A], http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-a.pdf (link). 
22
  See id. at 41–46. 
23
  See id. at 17–27, 30–34 (discussing the SEC’s failure to address Bear Stearns’s high concentra-
tion of mortgage securities, its inadequate process for addressing risky behavior by CSE participant 
firms, and its inadequate risk tolerance testing among its CSE staff); SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 446-B, at 12–14 (Sept. 25, 2008) (describing the SEC’s failure to enforce CSE 
rules regarding document retention and filings) (link). 
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about regulator competence and responsiveness.24  Repo transactions are 
collateralized loans involving a sale of a security for cash in which the sel-
ler commits to buy back the security at a specified price on a designated fu-
ture date.25  Repos are an important source of short-term financing for many 
market participants.26  According to a report by the Examiner appointed in 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case, Lehman’s use of a particular ac-
counting treatment for its repo transactions (Repo 105 treatment) essentially 
enabled Lehman Brothers to shift assets off its balance sheet at the end of 
each quarter in exchange for cash, making it appear as if Lehman had sold 
the assets when it in fact had not.27  Repo 105 treatment thus made Leh-
man’s balance sheet appear to be healthier and less leveraged than was ac-
tually the case.28  The assets were returned to Lehman’s balance sheet just 
days after issuing the financial reports reflecting the Repo 105 transac-





  See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, Vol. 4, at 1482, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
Ch. 11 Case No. 08-13555 (Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Valukas Report 4], available at 
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%204.pdf (―[W]hen the Examiner questioned Lehman execu-
tives and other witnesses about Lehman’s financial health and reporting, a recurrent theme in their res-
ponses was that Lehman gave full and complete financial information to Government agencies, and that 
the Government never raised significant objections or directed that Lehman take any corrective action.‖) 
(link); see also Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, Vol. 1, at 8, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
Ch. 11 Case No. 08-13555 (Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Valukas Report 1], available at 
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%201.pdf (―In mid-March 2008, after the Bear Stearns near 
collapse, teams of Government monitors from the [SEC] and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York . . . were dispatched to and took up residence at Lehman, to monitor Lehman’s financial condition 
with particular focus on liquidity.‖) (internal footnote omitted) (link). 
25
  Frank J. Fabozzi & Steven V. Mann, Private Money Market Instruments, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 231, 243 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 6th ed., 2006) (describing repo transactions); 
Christian Ewerhart & Jens Tapking, Repo Markets, Counterparty Risk, and the 2007/2008 Liquidity Cri-
sis 1 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper Series No. 08-24, Working Paper No. 909, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138609 (noting that in a typical repo ―the lender of 
cash is compensated by an interest that is calculated from the nominal value of the transaction, the term, 
and the so-called repo rate.‖) (link). 
26
  See Michael Mackenzie, Ultra-Low U.S. Rates Undermine Repo Market, FT.COM, Dec. 16, 2008, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2da96724-cbb1-11dd-ba02-000077b07658.html (noting that while ―the gov-
ernment repurchase or repo market [has been] a foundation stone for the financial system and trading 
Treasury debt,‖ the occurrence of ―[e]xtremely low short-term interest rates in the [United States] are 
sharply eroding [its] functioning.‖) (link). 
27
  Valukas Report 1, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
28
  See id.; see also Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, Vol. 3, at 739, In re Lehman Bros. Hold-
ings Inc., Ch. 11 Case No. 08-13555 (March 11, 2010) [hereinafter Valukas Report 3], available at 
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%203.pdf (―Lehman temporarily reduced its net balance sheet 
at quarter-end through its Repo 105 practice by approximately $38.6 billion in fourth quarter 2007, 
$49.1 billion in first quarter 2008, and $50.38 billion in second quarter 2008.‖) (link); id. at 759 (―Leh-
man used the borrowed funds from Repo 105 transactions to pay down short-term liabilities such as or-
dinary repo transactions[.] . . . By doing so, Lehman reduced its total assets, thereby reducing its 
leverage ratios.‖). 
29
  Valukas Report 3, supra note 28, at 734; Andrew Ross Sorkin, At Lehman, Watchdogs Saw It All, 
NYTIMES.COM, Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/business/16sorkin.html (link). 
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cial statement filings.30  Ernst & Young, which audited Lehman’s books, did 
not question the use or nondisclosure of the Repo 105 transactions.31  Simi-
larly, neither the SEC nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, both of 
which had been onsite at Lehman after the near collapse of Bear Stearns in 
March 2008, identified any problems with the Repo 105 transactions.32  
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008 in the largest 
bankruptcy filing ever.33 
While regulatory failures in the credit crisis have been widespread and 
certainly are not limited to the SEC, the entities for which the SEC had 
oversight responsibilities under the voluntary CSE program have comprised 
a key epicenter in the credit crisis.  This may be one reason why some pro-
posed legislation, including the Wall Street Reform Act legislation, gives 
the Federal Reserve oversight responsibilities for securities holding compa-
nies without bank affiliates that had been supervised by the SEC under the 
CSE program.34 
The fate of Lehman Brothers and other CSE participants offers lessons 
about the consequences of regulatory failure.  Cultures of trading facilitated 
by technological innovations and broad-reaching financial market networks, 
combined with pervasive use of OTC derivatives as essential links in such 
networks, call for a reevaluation of risk in financial markets.35  Considera-
tions of risk must take into account a bottom-up assessment of how trading 
practices shape financial market networks and the implications of such 
practices for systemic risk.  This means that systemic risk issues that in the 
past were primarily concerns for banking regulators are now relevant to a 
wider range of regulated and unregulated entities whose trading activities 





  Valukas Report 1, supra note 24, at 8 n.27. 
31
  Id. at 8. 
32
  See Sorkin, supra note 29 (explaining that multiple government regulators had a ―parent over 
shoulder‖ view of Lehman’s practices and yet sounded no alarms while Lehman Brothers used the Repo 
105 accounting treatment, either because they ―did not appreciate what [they] saw‖ or because they 
―blessed the now-suspect accounting‖ despite knowledge of its risks); see also Valukas Report 4, supra 
note 24, at 1497 (―Certain FRBNY on-site personnel expressed the view to the Examiner that the SEC 
on-site personnel did not have the background or expertise to adequately evaluate the data they were 
given.‖) (footnote omitted). 
33
  Valukas Report 1, supra note 24, at 2. 
34
  See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1961 (2009). 
35
  MOHAMED A. EL-ERIAN, WHEN MARKETS COLLIDE: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE AGE OF 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 141 (2008) (noting that OTC derivatives have ―enabled a far greater de-
gree of linkage across markets than at any other time‖). 
36
  See SEC, INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT 446-A, supra note 10, at 46–47 (noting that certain unre-
gulated firms may pose systemic risks); cf. George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank 
Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 17 (1996) (writing in 1996 that ―[b]ank (depository institutions) failures are 
widely perceived to have greater adverse effects on the economy and thus are considered more impor-
tant than the failure of other types of business firms[,]‖ and that ―[a]s a result, bank failures have been 
and continue to be a major public policy concern in all countries and a major reason that banks are regu-
lated more rigorously than other firms.‖) (footnotes omitted). 
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B. Regulatory Reform, Regulatory Principles, and Financial Firewalls 
1. Regulating the Regulators: Establishing Regulatory Principles 
and Regulatory Goals 
The credit crisis has revealed a number of important regulatory and 
regulator failures.  Thus, effective financial market regulatory reform must 
include specific mechanisms to enable better evaluation of the performance 
of regulators.  Establishment of specific principles that guide regulatory 
oversight could facilitate better evaluation of regulatory performance and 
better regulation.  Such principles can also help in both determining what 
regulations should be enacted, whether within a principles- or rules-based 
regulatory framework and also in making continuing decisions about which 
regulations should be changed or eliminated.  These fundamental financial 
regulation principles should include regulatory effectiveness and efficiency, 
regulatory responsiveness and flexibility, regulatory transparency and sim-
plification, and regulatory neutrality. 
The Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme illustrates the importance of regula-
tory principles and regulatory responses to and recognition of financial 
market practices and trading strategies.  Harry Markopolos, a former Ma-
doff competitor, tried for nine years to persuade the SEC to examine Ma-
doff’s operation, which Markopolos believed could only be the result of 
front-running (a less likely alternative) or some type of Ponzi scheme (a 
highly likely alternative): ―[f]ar better that the SEC is proactive in shutting 
down a Ponzi Scheme of [Madoff’s] size rather than reactive.‖37  Markopo-
los, a self-described derivatives expert, identified twenty-nine red flags in 
Madoff’s operation and in 2005, submitted a detailed seventeen-page memo 
with supporting documents that analyzed the Madoff Ponzi scheme to the 
SEC.38  Markopolos and others have suggested that Madoff’s stated trading 
and investment strategies would simply not have been possible with the 
amount of money Madoff managed, and they ―raised red flags that should 
have been obvious to the banks and investment firms that promoted Mr. 
Madoff.‖39 
Although the SEC Madoff Case Opening Memo notes that the SEC 
sought to ascertain whether Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme,40 the 
SEC Division of Enforcement Case Closing Recommendation does not dis-





  HARRY MARKOPOLOS, THE WORLD’S LARGEST HEDGE FUND IS A FRAUD: NOVEMBER 7, 2005 
SUBMISSION TO THE SEC 1–2 (2005). 
38
  Id. 
39
  Tom Lauricella, Aaron Lucchetti & Amir Efrati, Madoff Ran Vast Options Game, WSJ.COM, 
Dec. 16, 2008; see also Markopolos, supra 37; Greg N. Gregoriou & Francois-Serge Lhabitant, Madoff: 
A Riot of Red Flags, 10–20 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335639 (link). 
40
  SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, CASE OPENING REPORT, CASE NO.: NY-07563 (Jan. 24, 2006) 
(link). 
41
  SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, CASE CLOSING RECOMMENDATION, CASE NO.: NY-07563 (Nov. 
21, 2007) (link). 
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on voluntary document production and testimony by Madoff, the SEC Case 
Closing Recommendation concludes that the ―staff found no evidence of 
fraud‖ but did find that Madoff needed to register under the Advisers Act.42  
The SEC does not appear to have penetrated the true nature of Madoff’s op-
erations.43  The SEC case memo notes that Madoff had misled the SEC ex-
amination staff and had ―not fully disclose[d] to the examination staff either 
the nature of the trading conducted in the hedge fund accounts or the num-
ber of such accounts at [Madoff’s firm].‖44  Despite Madoff’s deception, the 
SEC recommended ―closing this investigation because both [Madoff and 
his largest client] voluntarily remedied the uncovered violations, and be-
cause these violations were not so serious as to warrant an enforcement ac-
tion.‖45  The regulatory treatment of the Madoff case demonstrates that 
effective, efficient, and responsive financial market regulation requires a 
delicate balance that involves industry expertise without industry cooption.  
The Madoff case also demonstrates the need for better regulatory under-
standing of the significance of trading and trading strategies in financial 
markets and the ways in which particular trading activities may be sugges-
tive of fraud or pose a broader systemic risk.46  Much like the Madoff case, 
the SEC did not undertake any enforcement action against Robert Allen 
Stanford’s Ponzi scheme, despite the fact that the SEC Fort Worth office 
appears to have known since 1997 that Stanford was likely running a Ponzi 
scheme.47  Between 1997 and 2004, the Ponzi scheme grew from $250 mil-
lion to $1.5 billion.48  During this time period, the Examination group in the 
Fort Worth office tried on multiple occasions but was unable to persuade 
the Enforcement group in the office to undertake a meaningful investigation 
of Stanford’s Ponzi scheme.49 
Efficiency and effectiveness, which draw attention to the efficacy, 
costs and benefits of regulation, are core regulatory goals that should be 
continually evaluated.  The Madoff and Stanford cases raise clear questions 
about regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, because financial market reg-
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lion Ponzi schemes.  The fact that the SEC did not discover the true nature 
of Madoff’s operations, despite the detailed Markopolos memo and suspi-
cious actions by Madoff, is an indictment of SEC effectiveness, if not effi-
ciency.  An approach that emphasizes regulatory efficiency would eschew 
regulations whose estimated benefits are less than their anticipated costs.  
Determinations of such costs and benefits should be an ongoing task involv-
ing elimination of inefficient or ineffective regulators and regulation based 
on cogent, objective, and verifiable grounds.  A regulatory culling process 
should be a prominent feature of the regulatory modification process so as 
to most efficiently deploy scarce regulatory resources.  Because of signifi-
cant resource and other funding limitations, regulators such as the SEC may 
be resource poor.50  Better strategic targeting of regulatory resources may 
help alleviate regulatory resource limitations.  Assessment of regulatory ef-
fectiveness and efficiency also requires development of better ongoing me-
trics of regulatory performance, including data about regulatory processes 
and outcomes.  Establishing ways to measure and monitor regulatory effec-
tiveness and efficiency should facilitate better regulatory processes.  The 
reality of competitive global financial markets also requires that the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of U.S. regulators be assessed from a comparative 
perspective that recognizes the global nature of financial market activities.51 
Regulatory responsiveness measures how regulators respond to exter-
nal events and changing business contexts.  Although some have criticized 
U.S. regulatory responses to the credit crisis for being too slow,52 as the 
SEC exemplifies, U.S. regulators have been more responsive than was the 
case prior to the credit crisis.53  Further, regulatory supervision of financial 
firms prior to the credit crisis reflected significant gaps and weaknesses.54  
For example, the seeming lack of a strong SEC response to the multi-billion 
Madoff and Stanford Ponzi schemes over multiple years reflects weak-
nesses in supervision and has led to significant criticism of the SEC on 
grounds of effectiveness and responsiveness and an investigation by the 
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The Madoff and Stanford Ponzi schemes and the Lehman Brothers 
failure highlight the need for regulatory flexibility, particularly in light of 
the financial and technological innovations and the complexity that have 
become characteristic of global financial markets.  Regulatory flexibility, 
which is tied to regulatory responsiveness, evaluates the extent to which 
regulators can be adaptable when responding to changing market condi-
tions.  The complexity and pace of innovation of financial markets necessi-
tates greater regulatory flexibility.  A need also exists for regulatory 
structures in which the shape, needs, and integrity of the market are key de-
terminants of regulatory approaches, rather than preexisting regulatory 
structures that may not be consistent with financial market developments. 
Regulatory transparency requires public dissemination of relevant reg-
ulatory information, which, in turn, can bolster the credibility and accoun-
tability of regulators.  Significant questions about regulatory accountability 
and transparency have accompanied the credit crisis, both with respect to 
the activities of regulators before and during the crisis, as well as with re-
spect to uses of bailout funds.56  Transparency may also enhance regulatory 
coordination both within and among regulatory agencies.  Transparency can 
enable those other than regulators to better understand the regulatory 
processes and outcomes.  Existing regulatory frameworks are somewhat 
transparent.  Significant information is broadly available, for example, 
about at least some regulatory outcomes through regulatory guidance and 
administrative decisions.  As continuing revelations about SEC investiga-
tion of the Madoff and Stanford Ponzi schemes suggest, though, less is 
known about regulatory processes, which is of particular concern in the af-
termath of the credit crisis.  The SEC’s censoring of its Inspector General’s 
report on the CSE program is similarly of concern from a transparency 
perspective.57  Although regulatory processes may need to remain confiden-
tial in some instances, performance reviews of public and non-public regu-
latory actions should be a continuing aspect of management and evaluation 
of both regulator performance and regulatory frameworks. 
The current U.S. architecture of multiple, and at times overlapping, 
regulators makes evaluation of regulatory processes difficult.  Where possi-
ble, regulatory reform should focus on implementing regulatory simplifica-
tion and neutrality.  Simplification is unlikely to be a panacea, but it may 
help make regulatory frameworks and processes more transparent, less cost-
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ly, and more effective.  Regulatory neutrality would help ensure outcomes 
for regulated entities that do not depend on the identity of their regulatory 
agency or connections with the regulators responsible for regulatory over-
sight.  The presence of multiple overlapping regulators encourages regulato-
ry arbitrage and is regulator-driven, in that existing regulatory structures 
may be the most important determinants of regulatory treatment, rather than 
the activities being regulated.58  A system based on specific principles is an 
important first step in creating regulatory frameworks that can better man-
age systemic risk.  Fundamental defining regulatory principles, which are 
largely missing from the Treasury Blueprint, but are present to some extent 
in the Obama administration’s 2009 Reform Proposal, should also be im-
portant factors in the ongoing evaluation of financial market regulatory 
frameworks and financial market regulators. 
2. Risk Barriers: Creating Financial Firewalls to Internalize Risk 
The burden of monitoring financial markets, however, cannot rest sole-
ly in the hands of regulators.59  Regulatory approaches in the future should 
attempt to regulate activities that might lead to systemic failures by facilitat-
ing the creation of firewalls around failing entities to limit the systemic ef-
fects of their failures.  Insurance, for example, could be one source of 
firewall protections.  These financial firewalls would be analogous to com-
puter firewalls or quarantines in the context of a medical epidemic.60  A 
regulatory approach that seeks to create firewalls requires flexible and effi-
cient regulatory frameworks that focus on oversight of the incentives within 
regulated firms such that firms internalize the risks of their operations.  This 
necessitates an approach that incorporates understanding by both regulators 
and firms of the role of trading and other activities as potential sources of 
risk.61 
In the aftermath of the credit crisis, regulators have attempted to some 
extent to focus on trading activities.  In 2008, the SEC and other securities 
regulators around the world focused on one specific trading activity, short 
selling, as the culprit in recent market volatility and declines, and banned or 
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the short selling ban has been hotly debated.63  SEC elimination of the up-
tick rule, which required that short sales of listed securities occur at ―a price 
above their last different sale price,‖64 has also been a subject of contention 
since the SEC abolished the rule in 200765 and adopted an alternative uptick 
rule in 2010.66  In the credit crisis aftermath, significant attention has been 
given to changing trading practices facilitated by technological and finan-
cial market innovations.67  As a result, increased regulatory scrutiny is now 
being given to the implications of practices such as flash trading and high 
frequency trading,68 as well as short selling and securities lending.69  Atten-
tion to such practices highlights the need for collection and analysis of data 
about the trading activities of a broad range of currently regulated and unre-
gulated market participants.  Acquisition of such data can help regulators 
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C. U.S. Regulatory Reform Proposals: New Foundations or Superficial 
Renovations? 
The credit crisis reflects a failure of U.S. regulatory frameworks in 
achieving financial market regulatory goals of financial institution safety 
and soundness and mitigation of systemic risk.70  Regulatory architecture 
and regulatory and industry practices are key reasons for these failures.  
Fragmented U.S. regulatory frameworks also have significant implications 
for financial market regulatory goals of market fairness and efficiency, as 
well as investor and consumer protection.71  A variety of potential financial 
market regulatory blueprints exist, including four basic approaches: the In-
stitutional, the Functional, the Integrated and the Twin Peaks.72  U.S. finan-
cial market regulatory structures include both Functional and Institutional 
aspects with an added layer of complexity in the form of a number of agen-
cies and actors at the state level.73  In many instances, the business con-
ducted determines oversight—the SEC has regulatory oversight for broker-
dealers, even those that are subsidiaries of banks subject to Federal Reserve 
oversight.74  The Federal Reserve and the Department of Treasury share re-
sponsibility for management of system stability.75 
A number of recent reform proposals have sought to address and ame-
liorate gaps in financial market regulation.  For example, both the Bush and 
the Obama administrations released financial market reform proposals that 
recommended the creation of new regulatory bodies and the consolidation 
of existing regulators.76  The Obama administration proposal would involve 
the creation of several regulatory bodies, including the Financial Services 
Oversight Council of financial regulators, the Office of National Insurance, 
the National Bank Supervisor (NBS), and the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Agency (CFPA).77  The CFPA is intended to give consumer protection 
a ―seat at the table‖ in the financial regulatory system.78  In March 2010, 
Senator Dodd introduced another financial market reform proposal that 
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case with recent legislative proposals, the Obama administration proposal 
also advocates for additional regulation of OTC derivatives.80 
Both proposals include mergers of existing regulators.  The Treasury 
Blueprint suggests that the SEC and CFTC should be merged, while the 
Obama administration proposal would keep the SEC and CFTC separate, 
with some unspecified future harmonization of futures and securities regu-
lation.81  The Obama administration proposal would move prudential super-
vision and regulation of federally chartered depository institutions from the 
OCC and OTS to the new NBS.82  Proposed new regulatory functions and 
entities under existing proposals might, in the end, substantially diminish 
any efficiency gains made from the elimination of duplicative and overlap-
ping regulatory bodies under both proposals.  Neither administration pro-
posal discusses dynamic aspects of proposed reforms to a significant extent, 
which makes the likelihood of implementing the existing proposals difficult 
to assess, particularly given public choice dynamics and the political reali-
ties of financial market regulation in the U.S.83  More than 1,700 pages 
long, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 200984 incor-
porates some of the Obama administration proposals, including the creation 
of the Financial Services Oversight Council and the CFPA.85  This legisla-
tion also proposes making the OTS a division of the OCC and imposes ad-
ditional regulation on certain OTC derivative transactions.86 
Existing regulatory reform proposals do not appear to sufficiently con-
sider why proposed changes in regulatory structures and approaches would 
result in more effective or efficient regulation.  Further, the overhang of ex-
isting regulation and general lack of attention to regulatory simplification 
does not appear to have been a prominent objective in any of these propos-
als, although the Treasury Blueprint’s optimal regulatory structure does 
contemplate significant redesign of U.S. financial market regulation based 
on the Australian Twin Peaks model.87  Similarly, the flexibility and respon-
siveness of any reformed regulatory structures would depend on dynamic 
elements related to how the structure is implemented and how regulators ac-
tually operate within the reformed regulatory structures. 
Existing reform proposals have significant hallmark design elements of 
U.S. financial market regulation.  In particular, all follow patterns of plac-
ing new regulatory obligations and bodies on top of existing ones, which is 
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ama administration-proposed CFPA, for example, would protect consumers 
in financial products and services markets, except for investment products 
and services already regulated by the SEC or CFTC.88  This means that the 
CFPA, as contemplated under the Obama proposal, would at the outset re-
flect the same type of regulatory fragmentation that was a factor in the cre-
dit crisis.  Existing regulatory reform would benefit from greater attention 
to the dynamics of regulatory frameworks that may have a significant im-
pact on regulatory effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness, flexibility, 
simplification, and neutrality.  In contrast to the treatment of regulatory 
fragmentation, existing reform proposals are more comprehensive in their 
understanding of the importance of the system-wide management of sys-
temic risk. 
D. Mapping Networks and Network Risk: The Need for Better Financial 
Market Data 
Despite some criticism of failures in Federal Reserve regulatory over-
sight prior to the credit crisis,89 a number of existing proposals would give 
the Federal Reserve responsibility as a systemic risk regulator.  In this role, 
the Fed would have access to information about the financial system more 
generally.90  In addition to giving the Fed power to regulate OTC deriva-
tives, the Obama administration proposal would impose record-keeping and 
reporting requirements on OTC derivative transactions.91  The nature of in-
formation collected by the Federal Reserve, other relevant regulators, or 
third parties is an important element of systemic risk management.  The 
Wall Street Reform Act would have the Federal Reserve act as an agent for 
the Financial Services Oversight Council with respect to identification and 
monitoring of systemic risk and would impose public reporting of aggregate 
swap data.92 
The credit crisis highlights the importance of collection, harvest, and 
analysis of financial market data.  Such data would enable better qualitative 
and quantitative understanding of financial network system dynamics, 
which should begin with consideration of trading practices, incentives and 
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egies.  The short selling ban reflects acknowledgment of the potential im-
portance of trading activities in relation to market declines and even sys-
temic risk.  Even if effective, however, the short selling ban is no substitute 
for collection of comprehensive data about trading activities.  Collection of 
such data would lend additional transparency from a regulatory perspective 
to a broad range of trading practices and enable a better assessment of the 
implications of such practices for financial market networks and systemic 
risk. 
As the credit crisis highlights, financial market contagion can easily 
spread from one financial sector to seemingly unrelated sectors.93  The types 
of risks posed by financial system networks can be conceptualized as risks 
that may require disclosure at the wholesale level.94  Existing securities reg-
ulation disclosure is largely retail in orientation.  Retail disclosure, howev-
er, is unlikely to provide sufficient information about systemic risk, in large 
part because it largely reflects an assessment of risk on a company-by-
company basis and is oriented toward the needs of the average retail inves-
tor.  The complexity of financial market networks requires an understanding 
of aggregate risk that is best assembled through specific wholesale disclo-
sure of trading activities of both regulated and unregulated entities.  Assur-
ances might need to be made concerning confidentiality of proprietary 
trading information for entities that submit information. 
Analyses of the spread of viruses in the computer network context sug-
gest that the nature of the network should be a key question in determining 
vaccination strategies to address network infection.95  In the financial mar-
ket context, mapping pervasive networks may be a critical tool in under-
standing and managing network risk.96  As a 1999 President’s Working 
Group report on OTC derivatives notes, access of regulators to information 
about the activities of unregulated affiliates of regulated entities ―consti-
tuted a gap in the system of financial market oversight that should be filled 
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tional risk assessment information.‖97  The credit crisis suggests that a simi-
lar gap may even exist with respect to risk assessment information of regu-
lated entities.98  Oversight of the trading and other activities of a broad 
range of regulated and unregulated market participants will require the col-
lection of significant data from both regulated and unregulated market play-
ers.  Such wholesale data could be used in confidence by regulators or 
trusted third parties in connection with the identification, evaluation, and 
management of activities that may pose a systemic risk. 
The activities of hedge funds exemplify the need for additional market 
intelligence about trading activities.  As economists Khandani and Lo note, 
hedge funds, in part by virtue of the liquidity and credit they receive 
through their prime broker relationships, have become ―active providers of 
liquidity and credit‖ and ―impose externalities on the economy that are no 
longer negligible,‖ which has led to ―hedge funds are becoming more like 
banks.‖99  As a consequence, like the failure of banks, the failure of hedge 
funds and other market participants whose trading activities may not be re-
gulated ―could have disastrous consequences for the viability of the finan-
cial system if it occurs at the wrong time and in the wrong sector.‖100  
Requiring some level of wholesale risk disclosure for all market partici-
pants, regulated and unregulated, can bolster the private market discipline 
that remains the dominant ethos of U.S. securities regulation by focusing 
both industry participants and regulators on sources of risk and enabling 
them to assess and address risk in a dynamic, comprehensive, and cogent 
fashion.101 
Getmansky, Lo and Mei suggest that regulators should collect the fol-
lowing information from hedge funds: monthly returns; leverage; assets un-
der management; fees; instruments traded; and all brokerage, financing, and 
credit relationships.102  In addition, Getmansky, Lo and Mei recommend that 
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as information about the capital adequacy of these financial institutions, 
from prime brokers, banks, and other hedge-fund counterparties.103  Specific 
party and transactional data should be required from market participants 
both in traditional exchanges, which already provide significant amounts of 
information in blue sheets,104 and in dark pools of liquidity.105  Collection 
and analysis of a broad range of data can enable better management of fi-
nancial network system dynamics and the systemic risk that can emerge 
from within such networks.  The proposed SEC Large Trader Reporting 
System could enable collection of trading data from large market partici-
pants (traders trading 2 million shares or $20 million during any calendar 
day or 20 million shares or $200 million during any calendar month).106  
The success of this initiative will depend to a significant degree on the 
SEC’s ability to effectively use and analyze any data collected. 
Regulation of financial market systemic risk should incorporate the 
concept of a single Market Stability Regulator, which could function as 
conceived by the administration proposals, or as a neutral third party, a sep-
arate regulator with systemic risk responsibility, or some combination the-
reof.  A Market Stability Regulator would collect data concerning past 
events to gain a better understanding of the forces that precipitated market 
crises in the past.  A Market Stability Regulator would also have a prospec-
tive role in monitoring and measuring systemic risk, using quantitative and 
qualitative data and models that have incorporated learning from ongoing 
data collection.  The goals of a Market Stability Regulator in managing risk 
should be to collect, analyze, and, when possible, publish aggregate data to 
facilitate the establishment of firewalls that can be used to both avert finan-
cial epidemics and prevent financial contagion from spreading.  A Market 
Stability Regulator would thus need the ability to collect information from a 
broad range of market participants.  Data collected by a Market Stability 
Regulator should be publicly reported to the greatest extent possible with 
appropriate redaction of nonpublic or proprietary information.  A complex 
and interconnected financial system requires sophisticated data collection 
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reflects an understanding of the reality on the ground within financial mar-
ket and regulatory contexts. 
